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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

Executive Registry
83-5421/1

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DOD COMMISSION ON BEIRUT INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT (BIA) TERRORIST ACT, 23 OCT 1983

10 November 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Subj: Request for Official Statements

06 DEC 1983

To ensure that we have a thorough understanding of the events relative to the Beriut International Airport Terrorist Act of 23 October, 1983, request you provide the Commission an official statement encompassing the following:

a. A synopsis of the total intelligence information on the subject which was available prior to the incident. Please include actual intelligence reports as an enclosure.

b. The distribution of this information and any restrictions placed on further distribution.

- c. Your assessment of the intelligence information's importance as a warning instrument to the Marines or others in their chain-of-command to the extent that it would enable them to identify a specific threat and cause a change in posture or Rules of Engagement.
- d. Your assessment of the overall adequacy of U.S. intelligence to provide warning of terrorist threats to U.S. personnel and facilities.
- e. Any of your own observations which you feel would enable the Commission to have a better understanding of the events before, during or after the event.

I further request that the Director, National Security Agency, from his SIGINT vantage point, also provide me the SIGINT perspective of these same five points in an official statement.

R. L. J. LONG Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret)

Chairman

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